EU Blog

Bulgaria’s euro area accession on 1 January 2026 is simultaneously a milestone of monetary integration and a political signal: it indicates that euro area enlargement, beyond quantitative convergence, has increasingly become an instrument of EU economic governance and Eastern stabilisation policy (European Commission, 2025a; European Central Bank, 2025a).

The sovereign debt and banking crises of the 2010s—especially in Southern European member states and Ireland—durably set the framework through which we interpreted the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At that time, attention focused on the accumulation of imbalances, the institutionalisation of fiscal discipline, and the “risk-sharing versus responsibility” debate.

By the 2020s, new crises (the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis) pushed the euro area beyond this earlier interpretive frame and added new dimensions. In an era of great-power competition and financial sanctions, currency is not merely a unit of account; it is also a channel of influence exercised through economic instruments, and it has increasingly become part of the financial infrastructure underpinning strategic competition (Farrell and Newman, 2019; James, 2025; Spielberger, 2025). In parallel, the EU’s differentiated integration is increasingly organised around euro area membership, and the “two-speed Europe” logic is now less a North–South cleavage than a divide between “euro area” and “non-euro area” members (Schilin, 2024). Finally, drawing lessons from crisis governance, the EU has built new, finely calibrated forms of economic governance and regulation linked to the euro area—especially via the European Semester and related conditionality instruments—that impose not only fiscal but also normative–institutional expectations on member states (Graham, 2024; Fromont, 2025; Fasone, 2024).

The accession of Bulgaria warrants interpretation through these three analytical dimensions. Membership strengthens the institutional underpinning of Eastern stabilisation and marks another stage in differentiated integration, further increasing the euro area’s weight in EU decision-making and economic governance. In addition, enlargement can be understood as an extension of the fiscal rule system: the rules and coordination mechanisms associated with euro area membership fundamentally reshape incentives and policy space in economic policy-making (European Central Bank, 2025a; Schilin, 2024; Graham, 2024).

Bulgaria is particularly instructive because it simultaneously illustrates the geopolitical characteristics of the Eastern periphery and the institutional logic of euro area integration: given its geographical and strategic position, accession can be interpreted as part of the EU’s Eastern stabilisation efforts. At the same time, Bulgaria’s monetary regime has long been tightly anchored to the euro. The national currency’s exchange rate was pegged to the German mark in 1997 and then, on 1 January 1999, automatically to the euro; accordingly, domestic monetary policy autonomy has been constrained from the outset. For this reason, the significance of accession lies less in changing the exchange-rate and monetary regime and much more in institutional membership and full participation in the economic governance framework. The “outsiders” group (Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden) is increasingly appearing as a distinct non-euro-area periphery within the EU (European Commission, 2025b).

The euro as a geopolitical “weapon”: financial infrastructure and Eastern stabilisation

The literature on the euro’s geopolitical role highlights two interrelated logics. The first relates to the currency’s international role: the more widely it is used as a reserve currency and for invoicing and payments, the greater the issuer’s political room for manoeuvre and the lower its vulnerability to external economic shocks (European Central Bank, 2025c). According to the ECB’s 2025 report, the euro’s share across several indicators of international currency use has remained “broadly stable,” and it continues to be the second most important global currency after the US dollar. This role is not merely a matter of prestige: in a crisis-prone and unpredictable international environment, it provides an important anchor of financial stability (European Central Bank, 2025c). The second logic concerns control over financial infrastructure: hubs of global networks (clearing systems, financial markets, jurisdictional gateways) enable the use of interdependence as a weapon (“weaponized interdependence”), in which network power becomes a political instrument (Farrell and Newman, 2019). In this context, the euro can contribute to deepening the EU’s own financial institutional and regulatory system and to reducing dependence on external (especially US) financial infrastructures (European Central Bank, 2025c).

A core precondition of the euro’s geopolitical weight is the depth and liquidity of financial markets and a sufficiently broad supply of “safe assets,” made possible by the EMU’s institutional framework and the decades-long development of euro-denominated markets. In the ECB’s interpretation, the euro’s global role is inseparable from the quality of Europe’s financial space: removing internal market barriers and deepening financing markets are key conditions for a well-functioning euro area, and EU bond issuance has become a meaningful factor in this regard (European Central Bank, 2025c). The same logic appears in analyses of one of the EMU’s newer elements, the Capital Markets Union (CMU): the CMU is framed as a financial precondition for the EU’s strategic objectives (innovation, the green–digital transition, defence financing) and as a structural support for the euro’s global role (Bruegel, 2025a; Bruegel, 2025b). The geopolitical dimension is therefore not only about foreign policy; it is also about internal market- and institution-building, since the currency’s geopolitical strength depends on the quality of integration.

Within this framework, Bulgaria’s euro area accession can be understood through complementary logics. As an “institutional anchor,” accession means above all that the country becomes more tightly connected to the EU’s deepest circle of integration: the predictability of the monetary and supervisory environment reduces the risk of financial instability and improves investor perceptions (European Central Bank, 2025a). From the perspective of resilience, the same step strengthens responsiveness to geopolitical shocks. The stabilising force of euro area membership lies in creating a more predictable financial environment: it strengthens access to the EU’s macro-financial safety net, improves credibility, and can durably reduce financing costs—especially in states like Bulgaria, where monetary policy autonomy is already limited (Panait and Radoi, 2025).

After 2022, the EU has used its internal market and financial rule system—and its market-access and supervisory capacities—more consciously (Quaglia and Verdun, 2023; James, 2025). To achieve foreign and economic policy goals, it has increasingly relied on financial instruments, from sanctions policy through shaping conditions of market access to expanding supervisory competences. Deepening internal monetary integration has thus become a key factor of geopolitical capacity for action.

In this reading, Bulgaria’s accession strengthens the institutional infrastructure of Eastern stabilisation: another member enters the governance space in which ECB monetary policy and associated supervisory–coordination mechanisms apply directly (European Central Bank, 2025a; European Central Bank, 2025c).

The transformation of “two-speed Europe”: euro area and non-euro area members as the new sides of differentiated integration

The literature on differentiated integration has traditionally examined how the EU can manage different depths of integration without risking disintegration. The EMU is particularly significant in this respect, because the common currency in practice requires deeper institutional and economic-policy cooperation and draws an increasingly sharp boundary between membership and remaining outside. After the crises, a common interpretation was that euro area members undertake deeper reforms, while the integration of outsiders stalls or remains superficial.

Bulgaria’s accession is ambiguous in this debate: it simultaneously represents the “closure” of differentiated integration (the euro area core expands and strengthens) and a “reduction” of differentiation (fewer outsiders). The actual effect depends on whether the remaining outsider countries—especially larger ones such as Poland and Romania—and those with politically conflictual relations—such as Hungary—treat accession as a strategic objective, or instead develop a durable, separate institutional identity (European Commission, 2025b; Schilin, 2024).

The euro area/non-euro area cleavage is not simply about whether the euro is the official currency in a given member state; it also reflects the dense economic-institutional and governance framework associated with the euro. Euro area membership entails participation in monetary decision-making and, indirectly, stronger economic-policy coordination, more intensive use of fiscal frameworks and crisis-management safety nets (European Commission, 2023). Even where certain elements operate formally at EU-27 level, euro area problems and solutions are often interpreted within a euro area frame and organise decision-making priorities around the “core” (Schilin, 2024).

Remaining outside is therefore increasingly less a purely economic cost–benefit calculation and more a question of political influence. The ability of non-euro-area member states to advance their interests weakens as the proportion and relative weight of outsiders decline while the euro area’s institutional core expands. Bulgaria’s entry is also symbolically significant: among Eastern member states, one more now uses the euro.

The key issue in differentiated integration is thus not whether “two-speed Europe” exists, but the principles along which it is organised. In the 2010s, debates often unfolded in a North–South frame (ordoliberal discipline versus Keynesian stabilisation). By the 2020s, euro area membership increasingly signals the quality of membership and the depth of institutional embeddedness: it expresses not only the use of a common currency but also belonging to denser frameworks of economic governance. For some member states, this position provides additional room for manoeuvre and stability resources; for others, it implies tighter constraints (Graham, 2024; Fasone, 2024). With membership, Bulgaria moves to a higher integration status in institutional terms: it not only adopts the euro but fully integrates into the euro area’s governance framework.

The euro area’s governance and regulatory framework

The euro area’s fiscal regulatory function is often reduced to the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact (in force since 1 July 1998): the reference value for the annual government deficit set at 3% of GDP, and the reference value for gross consolidated government debt set at 60% of GDP. In the wake of the crises, this framework was complemented by the Fiscal Compact (in force since 1 January 2013), which made structural and domestically embedded forms of budgetary discipline part of euro area governance. Yet the governance–regulatory logic has become deeper than this. As monetary sovereignty (exchange-rate policy, independent interest-rate policy) is constrained, the need for internal adjustment rises: in cases of competitiveness and fiscal problems, nominal devaluation is unavailable, so adjustment takes the form of “internal devaluation,” operating through wage dynamics, productivity, budgets, and structural reforms.

In Bulgaria’s case, one part of this regulatory system was already “built in” via the euro peg: the lev’s fixed exchange rate and the constrained scope for monetary policy already enforced a degree of fiscal–structural responsibility. Thus, the real novelty of accession is not the exchange-rate regime but full integration into the decision-making and supervisory regime (European Central Bank, 2025a; European Commission, 2025a).

One of the most important developments after 2010 is that the institutional form of governance and regulation changed: alongside simple fiscal rule enforcement, a continuous coordination–supervision system emerged (the “European Semester”), through which the Commission and the Council coordinate national economic policies—especially regarding budgetary trajectories, macroeconomic imbalances, and key structural reforms—and issue country-specific recommendations. Between 2011 and 2022, the Commission’s fiscal paradigm underwent a gradual shift from an ordoliberal approach toward a more Keynesian one, particularly after COVID-19 (Graham, 2024).

In this system, Bulgaria’s euro area membership means that Bulgarian fiscal and structural policies will align even more directly with the medium-term logic of euro area governance (European Commission, 2023; Graham, 2024).

Over the past five years, the economic governance and regulatory system has also expanded in a normative direction. The European Semester has become a mechanism for addressing rule-of-law risks, particularly by linking financial support (for example, disbursements from the recovery instrument) to reform conditions and governance standards (Fromont, 2025). In this way, rule-of-law criteria have become part of economic coordination. In responding to the economic crisis triggered by COVID-19, the EU also developed new, innovative mechanisms—above all, EU-level borrowing and the financing instruments built on it—which meaningfully expanded the toolbox of economic governance (Fasone, 2024).

Bulgaria’s entry is therefore not simply “joining a club,” but entering a governance regime that embodies a new balance between normative regulation, fiscal discipline, and crisis stabilisation (Fasone, 2024; European Commission, 2023).

Credibility, convergence, risks

Although the convergence assessments in the year preceding Bulgaria’s euro area accession were clearly favourable, both the ECB and the Commission indicated that stable, sustainability-oriented economic policy and further reforms are necessary for durable success (European Central Bank, 2025a; European Commission, 2025a; European Central Bank, 2025b). Convergence does not end on the day of accession: in the post-accession period it also denotes a medium-term trajectory shaped jointly by fiscal policy, price and wage dynamics, productivity, and institutional quality.

The legitimacy of euro area accession comes from both external and internal directions. External legitimacy stems from strengthened international credibility and investor confidence: euro area membership functions as a “quality seal” of economic policy. Internal legitimacy depends on whether citizens and firms perceive the benefits of accession (lower interest rates, price stability, investment environment) and how strongly they fear its economic and political costs (price rounding, identity and sovereignty issues).

In the euro area, legitimacy is not a one-off debate but a recurring structural problem. This is because membership combines the promise of stability with a tighter economic governance and regulatory framework: part of fiscal and economic-policy space shifts into common frameworks, and in crisis situations assistance is often conditional. As decisions concentrate in euro area forums, each new accession raises again the questions of who decides, with what mandate, and how democratic control and societal acceptance are ensured (Fasone, 2024; Fromont, 2025).

A structural risk of accession is that competitiveness differences can accumulate easily in a monetary union: if wage growth persistently exceeds productivity, external balances deteriorate and adjustment becomes politically costly as “internal devaluation” (wage and demand compression). The crisis histories of the 2010s (especially in Southern Europe) showed that economic adjustment in the euro area can generate political conflict. At the same time, governance innovations of the 2020s (more flexible medium-term plans, NGEU, the new fiscal framework) partly aim to ensure that adjustment does not appear solely as austerity, but can support a combination of reform and investment (European Commission, 2023; Fasone, 2024). The key to Bulgaria’s success is therefore not the fact of entry, but post-entry policy: whether it can sustain an economic trajectory that ensures both debt sustainability and convergence.

Changes in the euro area’s institutional governance system

An important question is whether Bulgaria’s euro area membership triggers structural changes affecting member-state interest representation in the euro area’s governance system, especially in institutional voting arrangements.

In the European Central Bank’s governance system, the central forum for monetary decision-making is the Governing Council, composed of the six permanent members of the Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks of euro area member states. To preserve decision-making efficiency, the ECB introduced a rotational voting system in the 2010s, similar in several respects to the practice of the US Federal Reserve (FOMC), keeping the number of voting rights manageable even as membership expands. The Executive Board members always have permanent voting rights, while national central bank governors rotate, with at most fifteen active votes.

Under the current rules, when the number of euro area members is between 19 and 21, national central bank governors are divided into two groups. The first group comprises the governors of the five largest economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands), who share four voting rights on a rotating basis. The second group comprises the governors of the remaining euro area countries, who share eleven voting rights. The system is not designed to reflect each country’s direct weight; rather, it ensures that decision-making remains manageable while the euro area’s economic heterogeneity increases.

The rules also contain an additional threshold: once the number of euro area members reaches twenty-two, the governors are divided into three groups. In that case, the first group still comprises the largest economies, while the second and third groups separate medium and smaller economies with different voting frequencies. This would represent not merely fine-tuning rotation but a more substantive reorganisation of internal governance proportions.

However, because the euro area remains below the threshold of twenty-two members with Bulgaria’s accession, the formal structure of the governance system does not change. The rotational logic nevertheless shifts perceptibly: one additional governor enters the second group, meaning that countries in that group individually receive voting rights less frequently. This does not alter the ECB’s legal decision-making framework, but it subtly rearranges internal proportions, especially regarding the participation frequency of small and medium-sized economies.

Bulgaria’s entry therefore does not bring a system-level turn in ECB governance; rather, within the existing rules it reinforces the trend toward monetary decision-making as an increasingly collective, rotation-based process. This fits the broader political-economy interpretation of euro area enlargement: deepening integration brings not only new members but also gradual re-weighting of modes of participation.

In the banking union and financial supervisory architecture, multiple participation and voting logics run in parallel. Bulgaria’s euro area entry does not affect all of them in the same way: in some cases, membership automatically confers participation rights, while in others representation is based on EU-27 membership, meaning that euro area headcount is not decisive.

Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the central preparatory body is the ECB’s Supervisory Board. Its composition is not rotational: it includes the chair and vice-chair, four ECB representatives, and representatives of the participating member states’ national competent authorities. Supervisory decisions typically proceed as follows: the Supervisory Board adopts a draft, which the ECB Governing Council finalises under a “non-objection” procedure. With Bulgaria’s entry, the internal proportion changes not as in the Governing Council, but simply by expanding national supervisory representation: a new participating authority appears in the body.

In the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the decision-making Plenary consists of the Board’s permanent members and representatives of the participating member states’ national resolution authorities; the European Commission and the ECB participate as observers. As in the SSM, Bulgaria’s euro area entry means the appearance of a new national resolution authority actor.

In the macroprudential supervisory system, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) operates in an EU-27 framework: in its General Board, voting members include the ECB President and Vice-President, national central bank governors, a Commission representative, the heads of the European supervisory authorities, and representatives of national macroprudential authorities. This means that Bulgaria’s euro area entry does not create a new “seat” here, as Bulgaria was already part of the body through its institutions; rather, it changes the relative weight of euro area versus non-euro area members.

In the EU’s microprudential supervisory authority, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the main decision-making body is the Board of Supervisors, which includes all 27 member states. Accordingly, the core logic of “member-state representation” does not depend on euro area membership, but the EBA’s rules and procedures include arrangements sensitive to the division between banking union participants and non-participants (for example, ensuring balance between participating and non-participating states for certain decisions). Bulgaria’s entry thus appears not as “more votes,” but as a strengthening of Bulgaria’s status within the banking union circle.

Overall, the ECB’s rotational system slightly reconfigures internal voting proportions for smaller countries, while representation in supervisory and resolution bodies expands according to the principle of “one participating member state – one national authority representation.” Here the internal shift is less about the number of votes and more about institutional focal points and agenda-setting effects.

The financial dimension of euro area membership: capital subscription and central bank income

Euro area membership represents a qualitative change not only in monetary and economic-policy terms, but also legally and financially, because the member state appears within the common central banking system not merely as a rule-taker but as an actor with a financial stake. It is worth examining the payment obligations linked to the ECB’s capital and the rules for distributing central bank income—including seigniorage—because these illustrate what membership means financially within the common central banking system.

A fundamental distinction regarding ECB capital is between “subscribed” and “paid-up” capital. Subscribed capital is the amount that all EU national central banks—based on the ECB capital key—are in principle committed to, regardless of whether they are euro area members. This is a legally defined, “nominal” share that expresses the ECB’s ownership structure but does not necessarily entail an actual cash transfer. Paid-up capital, by contrast, is the amount that national central banks actually transfer to the ECB and that appears in the common central bank’s balance sheet.

This distinction matters because under ECB rules, non-euro-area central banks pay only 3.75% of their subscribed share, primarily as an operational contribution, whereas euro area members must pay 100% of their share. As a consequence, the ECB’s total subscribed capital does not change materially with Bulgaria’s accession, since Bulgaria was already included in the capital key; what increases is the stock of paid-up capital. This “top-up” is the institutional moment when a country becomes not only legally but also financially a full participant in the Eurosystem.

An increase in paid-up capital is not merely an accounting technicality. This capital is one foundation of the ECB’s financial independence, and it is linked to participation in the distribution of central bank profit. In other words, Bulgaria’s euro area accession entails not only accepting rules but also making a real financial “entry” into the common central bank balance sheet, where some risks and returns are institutionally shared.

With Bulgaria’s euro area accession, the ECB capital’s “substantive” increase does not appear in subscribed capital. According to the most recent capital key determination, Bulgaria’s ECB capital key is 0.9783%, which corresponds to roughly €106 million in subscribed capital. Until now, Bulgaria paid only the 3.75% share; with euro adoption, it must pay the full amount, meaning that paid-up capital on the Bulgarian side is “topped up” by roughly one hundred million euros (European Central Bank, 2024; European Central Bank, 2025d). Institutionally, this is not merely a technical item: paid-up capital is a foundation of the common central bank balance sheet and signals that Bulgaria joins the full financial “ownership” circle of the monetary union. From the perspective of other members, paid-up capital increases while existing euro area members’ share ratios are marginally reweighted within the capital-key system (European Central Bank, 2024).

Membership also directly affects the distribution of the benefits of money issuance—more precisely, the distribution of central bank profits and monetary income. While Bulgaria was not a euro area member, it did not share in the ECB’s distributable profits. Upon entry, it becomes entitled to receive, in proportion to its paid-up capital share, a share of profits after provisioning (European Central Bank, 2024). In addition, within the Eurosystem, part of the monetary income linked to banknote issuance and monetary policy operations is settled and shared according to common accounting and distribution rules, which in practice are also closely tied to the capital key (European Central Bank, 2024; European Central Bank, 2025a). As a result, Bulgaria’s entry means not only access to the “common umbrella,” but also to a slice of the Eurosystem’s income flows: in the balance sheet of the Bulgarian central bank, a share of jointly generated profit/income appears in line with its capital key. For other member states, this necessarily implies slight dilution of shares, as the same common income is distributed among more participants under the same rules (European Central Bank, 2024).

Conclusion

Bulgaria’s entry fits an EU logic in which the euro area has become a shared resource for stability and crisis management. The gains from accession are not automatic: they relate not only to the day of adoption, but simultaneously to preparation and the post-adoption period. Entry is not an “end station,” but the beginning of a durable adjustment trajectory. Within euro area frameworks, convergence, stability, and international room for manoeuvre evolve in mutually reinforcing ways, tied to institutional rules and capacities.

Further enlargement of the euro area increases its weight and cohesion, extends the common framework of economic governance more widely, and shifts the dynamics of internal integration toward tighter, institutionally denser cooperation.

REFERENCES

• Bruegel (2025a) Capital markets union: a deep dive. Bruegel report, 11 March. Bruegel. Available at: https://www.bruegel.org/report/capital-markets-union-deep-dive (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Bruegel (2025b) Breaking the deadlock: a single supervisor to unshackle Europe’s capital markets union. Bruegel Blueprint Series 35, 26 June. Bruegel. Available at: https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/Bruegel%20Blueprint%2035.pdf (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• European Central Bank (2024) Annual Accounts of the ECB 2024. Frankfurt am Main: ECB. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/annual/annual-accounts/html/ecb.annualaccounts2024~718377b1c1.en.pdf (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Central Bank (2025a) ECB reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards euro adoption (Press release, 4 June). European Central Bank. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/html/ecb.pr250604~0f86d2a0f0.en.html  (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Central Bank (2025b) Convergence Report, June 2025. Frankfurt am Main: ECB. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/other-publications/convergence/pdf/ecb.cr202506~8941e288b6.en.pdf (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Central Bank (2025c) The international role of the euro, June 2025. Frankfurt am Main: ECB. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/ire/pdf/ecb.ire202506~e0f20d2d82.en.pdf (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Central Bank (2025d) Bulgaria to join euro area on 1 January 2026 (Press release, 8 July). European Central Bank.  Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2025/html/ecb.pr250708~b9676a9fa8.en.html  (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Commission (2023) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on the reform of the EU economic governance framework, COM(2023) 600 final (24 May). Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0600 (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Commission (2025a) Convergence Report 2025 on Bulgaria (Institutional Paper 320, 4 June). Brussels: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Available at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5ebf870c-1871-4359-a076-25b4dd29ff26_en?filename=ip320_en.pdf (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• European Commission (2025b) Convergence reports – euro area enlargement (webpage). Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-reports_en (Accessed: 18 December 2025).
• Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L. (2019) ‘Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion’, International Security, 44(1), pp. 42–79. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00351 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Fasone, C. and Lupo, N. (2024) ‘Learning from the euro crisis: A new method of government for the European Union’s economic policy coordination after the pandemic’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 22(3), pp. 882–904. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moae064 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Fromont, L. and van Waeyenberge, A. (2025) ‘The European Semester as a governance mechanism: A new stabilisation–discipline balance?’, European Journal of Risk Regulation. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2025.29 (Accessed: 19 December 2025).
• Graham, R. (2024) ‘Unpacking the European Commission’s fiscal policy ideas: Ordoliberalism, Keynesianism and the European Semester’, Journal of European Public Policy. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2274347 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• James, S. and Quaglia, L. (2025) ‘Geoeconomics and financial statecraft in the European Union: The case of critical market infrastructures’, Journal of International Economic Law, 28(3), pp. 490–504. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgaf026 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Panait, N.G. and Rădoi, M.A. (2025) ‘Economic evolution in euro-adopting states vs. future adopters: A comparative analysis’, Economies, 13(8), Article 239. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13080239 (Accessed: 19 December 2025).
• Quaglia, L. and Verdun, A. (2023) ‘The increasing geoeconomic usage of the Single Market for financial services’, EconPol Forum, 24(5), pp. 23–27. Available at: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/econpol-forum-2023-5-quaglia-verdun-single-market.pdf (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Schilin, A. (2024) ‘EU or euro area crisis? Studying differentiated integration as an idea structuring elite perceptions of the sovereign debt and the COVID-19 crisis’, Journal of European Integration, 46(1), pp. 1–22. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2220894 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
• Spielberger, L. (2025) ‘No longer neutral: The ECB’s geopoliticization of the international role of the euro’, Politics and Governance, 13. Available at: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8877 (Accessed: 20 December 2025).