EU Blog

In September 2026, a new and as yet legally undefined category—the concept of “associate membership”—emerged in relations between the European Union and Canada. In her State of the Union address on 16 September 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed that Canada become the EU’s first “associate member” and that the Comprehensive ...

In September 2026, a new and as yet legally undefined category—the concept of “associate membership”—emerged in relations between the European Union and Canada. In her State of the Union address on 16 September 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed that Canada become the EU’s first “associate member” and that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), concluded with Canada in 2016, serve as the foundation for a broader partnership centred on economic security and shared prosperity. The following day, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney welcomed the initiative in an address to the European Parliament. Although the parties’ political intentions have thus become clearer, the precise legal substance of the proposed arrangement has yet to take shape.

In recent years, the European Union has supported Ukraine through a series of interlinked financing instruments aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and ensuring the functioning of the state. As a next step, the Union has established a €90 billion Ukraine support loan facility for the period 2026–2027, which, beyond sustaining these objectives, is also intended to address longer-term ...

In recent years, the European Union has supported Ukraine through a series of interlinked financing instruments aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and ensuring the functioning of the state. As a next step, the Union has established a €90 billion Ukraine support loan facility for the period 2026–2027, which, beyond sustaining these objectives, is also intended to address longer-term financing needs and support reconstruction. The aim of this study is to provide a detailed analysis of the technical functioning of this €90 billion financing arrangement.

In its judgment delivered on 21 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Case C-769/22, Commission v Hungary, reached conclusions whose significance extends well beyond the successful challenge brought by the European Commission against the restrictions imposed by Hungary’s 2021 “child protection” law on LGBTIQ-related content. The decision is of landmark importance ...

In its judgment delivered on 21 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Case C-769/22, Commission v Hungary, reached conclusions whose significance extends well beyond the successful challenge brought by the European Commission against the restrictions imposed by Hungary’s 2021 “child protection” law on LGBTIQ-related content. The decision is of landmark importance because, sitting in full court, the Court for the first time found an autonomous breach of Article 2 TEU by a Member State, while also establishing infringements of internal market rules, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the General Data Protection Regulation.

In the short term, the new directions of Hungarian European policy are primarily organized around a few policy areas requiring immediate adaptation: compliance with the conditions for access to EU funds; the reform of migration policy and the termination of the resulting daily fine of one million euros; and participation in EU policies related to Ukraine, within the framework of financing mechanisms ...

In the short term, the new directions of Hungarian European policy are primarily organized around a few policy areas requiring immediate adaptation: compliance with the conditions for access to EU funds; the reform of migration policy and the termination of the resulting daily fine of one million euros; and participation in EU policies related to Ukraine, within the framework of financing mechanisms and accession negotiations.

In Case C-225/24 before the Court of Justice of the European Union—brought by the European Parliament against the European Commission—the Opinion of the Advocate General can be regarded as a milestone in the development of the Union’s rule-of-law framework. In her Opinion delivered on 12 February 2026 (Ćapeta, 2026), Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta proposed that the Court ...

In Case C-225/24 before the Court of Justice of the European Union—brought by the European Parliament against the European Commission—the Opinion of the Advocate General can be regarded as a milestone in the development of the Union’s rule-of-law framework. In her Opinion delivered on 12 February 2026 (Ćapeta, 2026), Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta proposed that the Court annul the Commission’s decision adopted in December 2023, which lifted the earlier suspension of EU payments destined for Hungary. The core of the Advocate General’s reasoning is that the Commission may not authorise disbursements from the Union budget to a Member State unless the pre-defined rule-of-law conditions are fully satisfied, have entered into force, and are effectively applied in practice.

After several months of debate and significant delay, the parliamentary deliberations on France’s 2026 budget concluded on 2 February 2026. The government ultimately secured adoption of the budget by invoking Article 49(3) of the Constitution, a provision that allows legislation to enter into force without a parliamentary vote, provided that the National Assembly does not adopt a motion of ...

After several months of debate and significant delay, the parliamentary deliberations on France’s 2026 budget concluded on 2 February 2026. The government ultimately secured adoption of the budget by invoking Article 49(3) of the Constitution, a provision that allows legislation to enter into force without a parliamentary vote, provided that the National Assembly does not adopt a motion of censure tabled in response to the procedure. Two no-confidence motions were submitted but rejected by the Assembly, and the draft budget law was consequently deemed adopted.

Bulgaria’s euro area accession on 1 January 2026 is simultaneously a milestone of monetary integration and a political signal: it indicates that euro area enlargement, beyond quantitative convergence, has increasingly become an instrument of EU economic governance and Eastern stabilisation policy.  The sovereign debt and banking crises of the 2010s—especially in Southern European ...

Bulgaria’s euro area accession on 1 January 2026 is simultaneously a milestone of monetary integration and a political signal: it indicates that euro area enlargement, beyond quantitative convergence, has increasingly become an instrument of EU economic governance and Eastern stabilisation policy.  The sovereign debt and banking crises of the 2010s—especially in Southern European member states and Ireland—durably set the framework through which we interpreted the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At that time, attention focused on the accumulation of imbalances, the institutionalisation of fiscal discipline, and the “risk-sharing versus responsibility” debate. By the 2020s, new crises (the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis) pushed the euro area beyond this earlier interpretive frame and added new dimensions. In an era of great-power competition and financial sanctions, currency is not merely a unit of account; it is also a channel of influence exercised through economic instruments, and it has increasingly become part of the financial infrastructure underpinning strategic competition (Farrell and Newman, 2019; James, 2025; Spielberger, 2025). 

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial support on an unprecedented scale. Whereas the EU budget could not previously borrow (with expenditures and revenues balanced each year), the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine made it necessary to develop common EU borrowing mechanisms. As a result, the EU now issues large volumes of common bonds to ...

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial support on an unprecedented scale. Whereas the EU budget could not previously borrow (with expenditures and revenues balanced each year), the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine made it necessary to develop common EU borrowing mechanisms. As a result, the EU now issues large volumes of common bonds to channel resources to its Member States and to third countries. This analysis examines the EU’s loan-based support architecture, with particular attention to joint borrowing techniques, risk- and burden-sharing arrangements, and the position of Member States that do not participate in specific support schemes. The study also covers the transformation of EU borrowing practice through the Stability Mechanism, NextGenerationEU, SURE and SAFE initiatives; the current instruments supporting Ukraine (Macro-Financial Assistance, MFA; and the Ukraine Facility proposed/established for the 2024+ period); the types and operational logic of joint borrowing structures; modalities of risk and interest-cost sharing; the situation and risks of non-participating countries; and the detailed design of disbursement and repayment arrangements.

In the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the traditionally prevailing principle of unanimity in decision-making has increasingly proven to be an impediment. One example is the issue of using frozen Russian state assets to assist Ukraine. The majority of Member States support the idea, but during the debates several have indicated opposing positions. In December 2025, ...

In the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the traditionally prevailing principle of unanimity in decision-making has increasingly proven to be an impediment. One example is the issue of using frozen Russian state assets to assist Ukraine. The majority of Member States support the idea, but during the debates several have indicated opposing positions. In December 2025, the European Commission put forward a novel proposal under which Member States could decide on the matter by qualified majority rather than unanimity. The purpose of this analysis is to interpret the legal background and consequences of the new mechanism.

In France – as in other European states – an increasing amount of fake news circulates on social media and in press outlets. Fake news not only misinforms, but systematically and deliberately undermines social stability (IFOP, 2018). On 28 November 2025, at a forum held for readers of the regional newspaper group EBRA in Mirecourt, Vosges, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed that, ...

In France – as in other European states – an increasing amount of fake news circulates on social media and in press outlets. Fake news not only misinforms, but systematically and deliberately undermines social stability (IFOP, 2018). On 28 November 2025, at a forum held for readers of the regional newspaper group EBRA in Mirecourt, Vosges, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed that, as one step in the fight against disinformation, courts should be able to decide within forty-eight hours, in fast-track proceedings, on the removal of fake news or content infringing human dignity from a given platform. A few days earlier, on 19 November in Arras, in a debate with readers of La Voix du Nord, he argued that a distinction should be drawn between platforms whose business model is based on personalised advertising and news portals operating under editorial responsibility. He proposed that every reliable media outlet operating in an ethical manner should receive a certificate.

The public standing of the British Labour Party had deteriorated markedly by autumn 2025, barely more than a year after its historic general election victory. In parallel, the popularity of the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has fallen to a historic low (Opinium, 2025), while the advance of the populist Reform UK party has been striking across the country. The analysis below examines the economic ...

The public standing of the British Labour Party had deteriorated markedly by autumn 2025, barely more than a year after its historic general election victory. In parallel, the popularity of the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has fallen to a historic low (Opinium, 2025), while the advance of the populist Reform UK party has been striking across the country. The analysis below examines the economic – and within that, primarily fiscal – drivers of this loss of support, as well as the possible responses available to the government. The evolution of popularity is, of course, also shaped by other economic, political and social factors, but their detailed examination falls outside the scope of the present study.

On 3 November 2025, King Charles III of the United Kingdom, by open letters patent, deprived his brother Andrew of the dignity of “prince” and of the style “His Royal Highness” (HRH). A few days earlier, by royal warrant, he had instructed the Lord Chancellor to delete the title “Duke of York” from the official Roll of the Peerage

On 3 November 2025, King Charles III of the United Kingdom, by open letters patent, deprived his brother Andrew of the dignity of “prince” and of the style “His Royal Highness” (HRH). A few days earlier, by royal warrant, he had instructed the Lord Chancellor to delete the title “Duke of York” from the official Roll of the Peerage

The debate over France’s 2025 and 2026 budget has already brought down three governments. With parliament deadlocked, some talk of an institutional crisis and even predict a collapsing political system. As in every year since 1974, the budget is not balanced: in 2024 the public deficit was 5.8% of GDP (€169.6 billion) and public debt stood at 113% of GDP (about €3.305 trillion). ...

The debate over France’s 2025 and 2026 budget has already brought down three governments. With parliament deadlocked, some talk of an institutional crisis and even predict a collapsing political system. As in every year since 1974, the budget is not balanced: in 2024 the public deficit was 5.8% of GDP (€169.6 billion) and public debt stood at 113% of GDP (about €3.305 trillion). Both figures are up from 2023 (a 5.4% deficit and 109.8% debt). Yet another president is trying to rein in spending. Why has the public finances issue turned into such a broad, unusual crisis now?

Russia’s aggression launched on 24 February 2022 against Ukraine has fundamentally called into question the European security order and has forced the sanctioning coalition to search for new solutions in normative, legal and financial terms.

Russia’s aggression launched on 24 February 2022 against Ukraine has fundamentally called into question the European security order and has forced the sanctioning coalition to search for new solutions in normative, legal and financial terms.

Tariffs are not beneficial to either the American or the European economy. The US import duties imposed on steel and aluminium products and on vehicles may drastically affect the European – and particularly the German – economy, as Germany is one of the largest exporters of goods and vehicles to overseas markets.

Tariffs are not beneficial to either the American or the European economy. The US import duties imposed on steel and aluminium products and on vehicles may drastically affect the European – and particularly the German – economy, as Germany is one of the largest exporters of goods and vehicles to overseas markets.